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Abstract
We consider a one-period Kyle (1985) framework where the insider can be subject
to a penalty if she trades. We establish existence and uniqueness of equilibrium for
virtually any penalty function when noise is uniform. In equilibrium, the demand of
the insider and the price functions are in general non-linear and remain analytically
tractable because the expected price function is linear.
We use this result to investigate the trade off between price efficiency and “fairness”:
we consider a regulator that wants to minimise post-trade standard deviation for a
given level of uninformed traders’ losses. The minimisation is over the function space
of penalties; for each possible penalty, our existence and uniqueness theorem allows to
define unambiguously the post-trade standard deviation and the uninformed traders’
losses that prevail in equilibrium.
Optimal penalties are characterized in closed-form. They must increase quickly
with the magnitude of the insider’s order for small orders and become flat for large
orders: in cases where the fundamental realizes at very high or very low values, the
insider finds it optimal to trade despite the high penalty. Although such trades –if
they occur– are costly for liquidity traders, they signal extreme events and therefore
incorporate a lot of information into prices.
We generalize this result in two directions by imposing a budget constraint on the
regulator and considering the cases of either non-pecuniary or pecuniary penalties. In
the first case, we establish that optimal penalties are a subset of the previously optimal
penalties: the patterns of equilibrium trade volumes and prices is unchanged. In the
second case, we also fully characterize the constrained efficient points and penalties
and show that new patterns emerge in the demand schedules of the insider trader and
the associated price functions.
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1 Introduction
This paper derives and uses analytical results about a one-period Kyle (1985) model with
non-Gaussian noises and penalties associated with insider trading. The natural benchmark
for such a framework is a one-period Kyle model with non-Gaussian noise and without
penalties. Characterizing the benchmark equilibrium is useful in order to study the more
general case with penalties.
Rochet and Vila (1994) have studied this problem under the assumption that the informed
trader is able to observe the noise trader’s demand and can therefore condition its order to
this demand. In that context, they show existence and uniqueness of equilibrium regardless
of the distributional assumptions on the noises. Unfortunately, their approach does not allow
in general to construct explicitly the equilibrium. Furthermore, it does not seem possible
to replicate their result in the presence of penalties.1 But allowing for penalties on insider
trading is crucial for our purpose. Indeed, we want to understand how a regulator can trade
off efficiently between information incorporation and protection of liquidity traders, and how
he can slide along the efficient choices depending on the weights he attributes to these two
conflicting objectives.
Bagnoli, Viswanathan, and Holden (2001) study different models of market making with
one or several strategic agents without the assumption of normality and without hypothetiz-
ing that strategic agents can observe the noise traders’ demand. A one-period Kyle model
with one strategic trader and non-Gaussian noise is a particular instance of their analysis.
Their results imply that in that case, when the distribution of the noise equals in law a
linear transformation of the fundamental, a linear equilibrium exists. In this equilibrium,
the demand of the IT has the same distribution as the demand of the NT, what we call a
mimicking property.2 Bagnoli, Viswanathan, and Holden (2001) only focus on linear equi-
libria. When adding an arbitrary penalty function to the model, one can no longer expect
to have linear equilibria, and there is a priori no method to construct equilibria explicitly
in a systematic manner.
We use a setup that remains tractable after the introduction of any penalty function —
at the cost of a distributional assumption. We find that uniform noise has the property that
even though the IT demand function and the price function are non-linear, the expected price
function is linear, whatever the penalty C. The equilibrium demand then simply appears as
the maximiser of a known objective. We obtain uniqueness of the equilibrium among virtually
all strategies for any penalty C as a simple corollary of our analysis. By contrast, proving a
general uniqueness result for the one-period Kyle model with Gaussian noise without penalty
was an extremely involved mathematical problem which was only addressed almost thirty
years after the Kyle (1985) seminal paper (Boulatov, Kyle, and Livdan (2013), McLennan,
Monteiro, and Tourky (2017)).
1In Rochet and Vila (1994), the proof of existence and uniqueness relies on the fact that equilibrium price
functions are optimal price functions in the sense that they minimise the expected insider gains’ functional.
This property holds true because they can write the chain of equivalences (X,P ) equilibrium ↔ E[X|d] = 0
↔ P optimal price function, where d is the aggregate order. With a penalty C, the central link breaks down,
because then the first order condition of the insider’s program combined with the price efficiency condition
yields p′(d)E[X|d] = E[C ′(x)|d].
2We provide a discussion in Appendix C.
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2 The Model
As in the one-period version of Kyle (1985), the model features a risk-neutral insider trader
(IT), noise traders (NT) and competitive market makers (MM). Agents are trading an asset
with fundamental value v. The IT perfectly observes v and places an order X(v). NT have
a stochastic demand u independent of v. MM observes the total demand X(v) + u and
executes orders at a price P such that she breaks even on average.
The first difference of our model with Kyle (1985) is that we consider uniform – instead
of Gaussian – noises:
u ∼ U(−1, 1),
v ∼ U(−1, 1),
u ⊥ v.
The choice of [−1, 1] as the support is for clarity and without loss of generality; one could
equivalently assume u ∼ U(−a, a) and v ∼ U(b, c) with a > 0 and b < c: see Appendix A.1.
The second difference is that a regulator may decide to penalize trades of size x by a cost
C(x). We interpret C as a product C = αC˜: α is the exogenous probability that the regulator
starts and successfully completes an investigation, while C˜(x) is the cost imposed to the IT
conditional on the investigation being successful and the order of the IT being x. Success of
the investigation means that the regulator correctly identifies the order of the informed trader
x and gathers sufficient evidence to enforce payment of the corresponding fine. In other cases,
the IT can not be constrained to pay any fine. Under these assumptions, the regulator never
makes type 1 errors (never convicts a trader that didn’t use insider information) but can
make type 2 errors (not convicting a trader that did use insider information).
2.1 The Insider Trader’s Problem
2.1.1 Benchmark Equilibrium without Penalties
In the absence of penalties, the IT solves
max
x∈I
xEu[v − P (x+ u)] (1)
taking the price function P of the MM as given. The MM breaks even on average:
P (d) = E[v|X(v) + u = d]. (2)
An equilibrium is a pair (X,P ) that satisfies (1) and (2).
From the discussion in section 1, (X,P ) defined by
X(v) = v (3)
P (x+ u) =
x+ u
2
(4)
3
is an equilibrium of the one-period Kyle model without penalty. We refer to it as the (linear)
mimicking equilibrium. Indeed, X(v) and u are equal in distribution. Notice that the image
of X is [−1, 1]. We will prove later that this equilibrium is unique among all equilibria
featuring a non-decreasing demand whose image lies in [−1, 1].
With penalties, the optimal demand is no longer mimicking the random demand u. One
intuitive interpretation is that while mimicking u allows the IT to best conceal herself from
the market maker, she can’t hide from the regulator (in case investigation is open and
succeeds). This leads to a lower demand than in the case without penalties. We now define
formally the equilibrium with penalties.
2.1.2 One-Period Kyle Model with Penalties
The IT solves
max
x∈I
xEu[v − P (x+ u)]− C(x), (5)
taking the price function P of the MM as given. The MM breaks even on average:
P (d) = E[v|X(v) + u = d]. (6)
This game involving the IT and the MM is denoted K(C). An equilibrium of K(C) is a pair
(X,P ) such that X solves (5) and P satisfies (6).
The interval I ⊂ R in the maximisation program (5) is the set of admissible insider’s demand.
In order to be able to prove uniqueness, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 1 I = [−1, 1].
The bounds of I are those that obtain in the linear mimicking equilibrium when there is
no penalty function. They are therefore natural: a demand function X whose image is not
contained in [−1, 1] would imply that for some values of the fundamental v, the magnitude
of the IT order is higher when there is a penalty, compared to the linear equilibrium without
penalty.3
To conclude this section, we state two remarks and introduce some notation.
(i) The data of a strategy X implies a pricing function P via equation (6). That is, if
X is part of an equilibrium, then the pricing function must be given by P . We denote the
pricing function associated with a demand schedule X by P (X).
(ii) In the IT’s maximisation program (5), the pricing function P only intervenes through
the expected price function, denoted Pˆ and defined by
Pˆ (x) = Eu[P (x+ u)]. (7)
Pˆ represents the price that the risk-neutral IT will face on average if she places an order x.
3At present, we do not know whether an equilibrium featuring such a demand function can exist.
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The program (5) can be rewritten in terms of the expected price function only:
max
x∈I
x(v − Pˆ (x))− C(x). (8)
2.1.3 Out-of-Equilibrium Pricing
The noise u we consider has bounded support. Moreover, the discussion above indicates that
the equilibrium demand functions X we will consider satisfy |X|≤ 1. This means that the
aggregate order, d = X(v) + u belongs to a bounded set D. The conditional expectation in
(6) is not defined for values of d /∈ D, meaning that we must make an assumption on the
out-of-equilibrium pricing of the MM:
Assumption 2 For any equilibrium (X,P ) of K(C) we consider, with X non-decreasing
and X([−1, 1]) ⊂ [−1, 1], we always impose the following out-of-equilibrium pricing (letting
xM = X(1)):
P (d) = 1 for d > 1 + xM
P (d) = −1 for d < −1− xM .
This assumption states that when the MM observes a positive aggregate order larger than
its maximal possible equilibrium size, she prices the asset as if it had realized at its maximal
value, v = 1. Similarly, when the aggregate order is negative with a magnitude larger
than the maximal possible equilibrium size, the MM prices as if v = −1. When constructing
equilibria, we do not always recall that Assumption 2 is used to define the out-of-equilibrium
pricing. When verifying that (X,P ) is an equilibrium, one must not only check that X(v)
maximises the IT’s program (5) among all x in the candidate support [−xM , xM ], but also
among values of x in I \ [−xM ;xM ]. For these values of x, the aggregate order d = x + u
realizes in the out-of-equiibrium region with positive probability, in which case Assumption
2 defines the price P (d).
Finally, notice that Assumption 2 fully characterizes out-of-equilibrium pricing: indeed,
any d ∈ [−1 − xM , 1 + xM ] belongs to the support of u + X(v), since u is U(−1, 1) and
xM ≤ 1.
2.1.4 A first example
We now present an example of an equilibrium of K(C). More illustrations can be found in
section 3.4, where we discuss the intuitions behind some typical behaviours of the equilibrium
demand and price functions in the presence of penalties.
Let K ∈ (0, 1
2
)
and
C(x) = KIx 6=0.
Under this penalty function, the insider trader undergoes an expected sanction of K if
she trades. This example is particularly important because we will see that such penalty
functions are among the optimal regulations.
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We will show that (X,P (X)) is an equilibrium, where
X(v) = vI|v|>√2K . (9)
As we will see, the price function P (X) is non-linear but the expected price function Pˆ
satisfies Pˆ (x) = x
2
. Hence, the IT maximises under the same expected price function as
in the linear mimicking equilibrium. Facing an expected price identical to the one without
penalties, the IT only trades when its previously optimal strategy — the linear mimicking
demand — allows her to recoup the penalty K on average. Without penalties, the profit
of the IT when she observes a fundamental v is v
2
2
. With a constant penalty upon trading
equal to K, the IT does not trade as long as v
2
2
< K. When v
2
2
> K, the IT considers K as
a sunk cost and optimizes as if there was no penalty, thus selecting X(v) = v. Notice that
the demand function is non-linear and exhibits a jump at ±√2K.
2.1.5 Indistinguishable Equilibria
In the equilibrium of the example above, the IT would earn the same profit upon observation
of v = ±√2K by selecting X(v) = 0 or X(v) = v: zero in both cases. In general, when the
penalty function exhibits jumps, we should expect the existence of such indifference points.
At these points, the IT can achieve a given profit by placing a small order and undergoing
a small expected sanction or by placing a larger order, associated with a larger expected
penalty. However, as long as the set of v such that the maximisation program of the IT (5)
admits several solutions has measure zero, these indifference points will almost surely not be
reached. The equilibrium will therefore be independent of the choice of the maximiser X(v),
in the sense that any ex post model observable is almost surely the same — e.g. demand
of the IT X(v), observed price P (d) — and any ex ante model quantity — such as the
IT expected profit or the expected penalty collected from the IT — is the same. In that
case, we wish to consider that any choice of maximiser X induces the same equilibrium.
We formalize this by introducing an equivalence relation between equilibria that we call
indistinguishability.
Assume that X and X ′ are two solutions of the IT’s maximisation program (5) and agree
outside of a countable set. In that case, P (X) = P (X ′). This means that if (X,P ) is an
equilibrium then so is (X ′, P ). This leads us to the following definition.
Definition 1 Let (X,P ) and (X ′, P ′) be two equilibria of K(C). We say that (X,P ) and
(X ′, P ′) are indistinguishable if X and X ′ agree outside of a countable set. Indistinguisha-
bility defines an equivalence relation over the set of equilibria of K(C).
From now on, we identify an equilibrium of K(C) to its equivalence class. Definition 1 is
useful because we will see that maximisers of (5) have to agree outside of a countable set,
and so the equilibria they induce will belong to the same equivalence class.
6
2.2 The regulator’s problem
In our model, the regulator is concerned about two quantities:4 (i) the post-trade standard
deviation of the fundamental, σ(v|d) and (ii) the P& L of the uninformed traders:
g(u, v) = u(v − P (X(v) + u)). (10)
Quantity (i) matters because one would like to have informative prices: when (i) is small,
the residual uncertainty about v is also small. Quantity (ii) captures the willingness of the
regulator to have liquid markets. In a liquid market, agents who have to trade for non-
fundamental reasons do not experience high losses. This corresponds to a situation where
g is not too negative. The core issue is that improving upon criterion (i) generally causes
criterion (ii) to worsen.
Let
S = E[σ(v|d)] (11)
be the expectation of the post-trade standard deviation of v and
G = E[g(u, v)] (12)
denote the expected P& L of the NT.
The objective of the regulator can now be stated as the characterization of the efficient
frontier, with the following definition:
Definition 2 (i) A point (G,S) is implementable if it is the outcome of an equilibrium of
K(C) for some admissible penalty C.
(ii) An implementable point (G,S) is dominated by (G′, S ′) if (G′, S ′) is implementable and
G′ ≥ G, S ′ ≤ S with at least one strict inequality.
(iii) The set of implementable non-dominated points is called the efficient frontier.
In section 5.2, we will need the following refinement of (ii):
(ii’) An implementable point (G,S) belonging to some subset of the plane H is dominated in
H by (G′, S ′) if (G′, S ′) is implementable, G′ ≥ G, S ′ ≤ S with at least one strict inequality
and (G′, S ′) ∈ H.
Points outside the efficient frontier are irrelevant from the regulator’s perspective, as she can
improve upon one of his objectives without harming the other one. By contrast, any point
belonging to the efficient frontier could be picked by a regulator for a suitable weighting5
of the objectives. Our goal is to characterize the efficient frontier and the penalties that
implement it.
4 In section 5.2, the regulator additionally needs to take care of the expected fine she collects for budget
reasons.
5Not necessarily linear.
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2.3 Admissible penalty functions
We do not impose any restriction on the penalty function, except that it only depends in a
non-decreasing manner on the magnitude of the order of the insider trader, and that there
is no sanction when she does not trade.
Definition 3 C : [−1; 1]→ R+ is a penalty function if it is symmetric and non-decreasing,
left-continuous over [0; 1] and satisfies C(0) = 0. The set of penalty functions is denoted C.
The class C is very general and defined by economically relevant requirements. In particular,
it would be unnatural and perhaps politically hard to implement to impose a higher sanction
on a smaller trade. The left-continuity assumption simply makes sure that the supremum of
the possible profits is attainable.
3 Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium for K(C)
In this section, we set out to prove the following Theorem:
Theorem 4 For any C ∈ C, the Kyle game K(C) with penalty function C admits a unique
equilibrium (X(C), P (C)).6 In general, X and P are non-linear.
One consequence of this result is that for each C ∈ C, the regulator’s quantities of interest
are defined unambiguously as the outcomes of the unique equilibrium in K(C). In particular,
the efficient frontier is defined unambiguously.
3.1 Analysis of the expected price function
3.1.1 Under uniform noises, the expected price function is linear regardless of
the IT demand
Lemma 1 contains the key observation at the root of our analysis. Recall that for any odd
non-decreasing function X : [−1, 1] → [−1, 1], we denote by P (X) the pricing function
associated with X (equation (6)) and given P = P (X), Pˆ is the expected price function
(equation (7)): Pˆ (x) is the price that the IT will face on average if she places an order x.
Lemma 1 Let X : [−1, 1] → [−1, 1] be an odd non-decreasing function, and xM = X(1).
The expected price function Pˆ is linear on [−xM , xM ]:
Pˆ (x) =
x
2
.
Lemma 1 is crucial because it makes the surprising statement that the expected price
function that must prevail in equilibrium is Pˆ (x) = x/2 without requiring any knowledge:
neither the form of C nor guesses about X or P are needed.
6Recall that equilibria are identified with their equivalence class, see Definition 1 .
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In turn, this implies that the equilibrium demand of the IT, X(v), must be a maximiser
of
ψC(., v) : x 7→ x
(
v − x
2
)
− C(x), (13)
as the IT maximises its expected profit knowing that Pˆ (x) = x/2. This demand X induces
some price function P . Remark that, again by Lemma 1, the expected price indeed satisfies
Pˆ (x) = x/2. This indicates that (X,P (X)) is an equilibrium of K(C).
While this discussion provides the intuition on how we construct the equilibrium of K(C)
for an arbitrary C, several technical issues must be addressed in order to make the argument
formal. One must check that any selection of maximiser is non-decreasing and take care of
the out-of-equilibrium pricing: notice in particular that Lemma 1 only characterizes Pˆ over
[−xM , xM ], while we need to compute the IT’s expected profit for all admissible demands x.
Additional results are also required to establish uniqueness of he equilibrium of K(C). The
main step in that direction is to show that ψC(., v) admits a unique maximiser except for a
countable number of values of v (section 3.2).
We now provide the proof of this lemma. Section 3.1.2 clarifies the main intuitions.
Proof of Lemma 1. We use the notation p(.) for a density and p(.|.) for a conditional
density. Write
p(v|d) ∝ p(d|v)p(v)
∝ IX(v)∈[d−1;d+1]Iv∈[−1;1].
That is, for −1− xM ≤ d ≤ 1 + xM , v|d is uniform over
{v ∈ [−1; 1]|X(v) ∈ [d− 1; d+ 1]} = {v ∈ [−1; 1]|X(v) ∈ [d− 1; d+ 1] ∩ [−xM ;xM ]}
= [(X−1` ((d− 1) ∨ (−xM)) ;X−1r ((d+ 1) ∧ xM))]
(14)
where
X−1` (x) = inf{v|X(v) ≥ x}
X−1r (x) = sup{v|X(v) ≤ x}.
X−1` and X
−1
r only disagree when there is v such that X(v) = x and X is locally constant
at v, i.e. they agree outside of a countable set. Then, letting P = P (X),
P (d) =
1
2
(
X−1` ((d− 1) ∨ (−xM)) +X−1r ((d+ 1) ∧ xM)
)
.
Now since
Pˆ (x) =
1
2
∫ x+1
x−1
P (z) dz,
by differentiation it is enough to show that P (x+1)−P (x−1) = 1 a.e.. Using the expression
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of P found above, we obtain that for −xM ≤ x ≤ xM :
2(P (x+ 1)− P (x− 1)) = X−1` (x ∨ (−xM)) +X−1r ((x+ 2) ∧ xM)
− X−1` ((x− 2) ∨ (−xM))−X−1r (x ∧ xM)
= X−1r (xM)−X−1` (−xM)
= 2
a.e.. This is because X−1` = X
−1
r a.e., X
−1
r (xM) = 1, and X
−1
` (−xM) = −1.
Having identified Pˆ , we know that the insider trader’s problem is to maximise ψC(., v) as
defined in (13). Because we will use this function throughout the paper, we repeat its
definition here:
Definition 5 The insider’s expected profit (under the correct expected price function Pˆ (x) =
x/2) for a demand x when the fundamental value is v is
ψC(x, v) = x
(
v − x
2
)
− C(x). (15)
Notice that ψC is an “expected” profit because we interpret C as an average cost —an
investigation may not be started or not succeed— while Pˆ (x) is an expected price because
the realization of u is random and the realized price is P (x+ u).
3.1.2 Intuition
In order to isolate the intuition behind Lemma 1, let us consider the case where X is con-
tinuous and strictly increasing.
Assume that the market maker observes an aggregate order d > 0. Since the demand of
the noise traders u takes values in [−1, 1], the possible demands of the IT X(v) consistent
with the observation of d are exactly the admissible demands such that d−1 ≤ X(v) ≤ d+1.
Because admissible demands satisfy X(v) ≤ 1 and d+1 > 1, the information obtained by the
market maker when she observes d is thatX(v) ≥ d−1. Thus, she knows that v ≥ X−1(d−1).
Intuitively, the fact that the aggregate order is positive rules out extreme negative values of
v and the MM deduces a lower bound on v, X−1(d− 1).
Moreover, due to the uniform noise assumption, all values of v above this lower bound
are equally likely. Therefore, the price P (d) is given by the midpoint of the interval
[X−1(d− 1), 1].
In a similar manner, when d < 0, the price P (d) is given by the midpoint of the interval
[−1, X−1(d+ 1)].
Now, assume that the IT wants to place an order x. The IT is only concerned by the
expected price impact, Pˆ (x), which is a uniform average of the P (d) over d ∈ [x− 1, x+ 1],
the set of possible aggregate demands given an IT demand x. If, instead, the IT decides to
place an order x+∆x, the set of possible aggregate demands d is d ∈ [x−1+∆x, x+1+∆x]:
see Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Marginal expected price impact of an increase in x
Thus, the only contribution to the marginal increase in expected price Pˆ (x+ ∆x)− Pˆ (x)
is due to the fact that the weight that was attributed to the interval [x − 1, x − 1 + ∆x] is
now attributed to the interval [x+ 1, x+ 1 + ∆x]. Crucially, this weight is the same due to
the uniform noise assumption. Considering a vanishing ∆x, one concludes that the marginal
impact of increasing demand on expected price is proportional to P (x+ 1)− P (x− 1).
We have seen above that P (x+ 1) is the midpoint of [X−1((x+ 1)− 1), 1] = [X−1(x), 1],
and that P (x− 1) is the midpoint of [−1, X−1((x− 1) + 1)] = [−1, X−1(x)]. Therefore, the
marginal impact on the expected price is proportional to the distance between these two
midpoints:
d
dx
Pˆ (x) ∝ P (x+ 1)− P (x− 1) = 1 +X
−1(x)
2
− X
−1(x)− 1
2
= 1.
Figure 2 provides an illustration of this result. This shows that the expected price function
is linear. Notice that the arguments above rely heavily on the uniform noise assumption:
with other noises, one cannot expect in general to have a linear expected price function.
3.2 Candidate optimal demands are unique up to changes on a
countable set
In this section, we set out to obtain an unambiguous definition of the strategy X that will
be our maximiser.
Definition 6 Let V , I be two intervals of R. A correspondence X : V → P(I) \ ∅ is
non-decreasing if for any v1 < v2 in V , supX (v1) ≤ inf X (v2).
Notice that if X is a one-to-one mapping, then we recover the usual notion of a non-decreasing
function.
Lemma 2 Let X : V → P(I) \ ∅ be a non-decreasing correspondence. Then for all v in V
except on a countable set, X (v) is a singleton.
11
Figure 2: The marginal expected price impact is constant
Proof. The argument is the same as for the proof that a non-decreasing function has at
most a countable number of discontinuities.
For a given penalty C ∈ C, let XC be the correspondence mapping v ∈ [−1; 1] to the set of
maximisers of the insider trader’s profit function when she observes a realization v of the
fundamental:
XC(v) = arg max
x
ψC(x, v).
Recall that ψC is defined in (15).
Lemma 3 For any v ∈ [−1, 1], XC(v) 6= ∅, and XC is a non-decreasing correspondence.
Proof. First, let us show that XC(v) is never empty. Let v ∈ [−1, 1], the function ψC(., v)
has a finite upper bound as C ≥ 0. Let M = supx ψC(x, v) < ∞ and (xn) such that
ψC(xn, v) → M . There is an extraction of (xn), still denoted (xn), such that xn converges
to x and either (i) (xn) is increasing or (ii) (xn) is decreasing. By symmetry, we can assume
without loss of generality that x > 0 or x = 0 and the case (ii) holds. Let us first consider
case (i). Since C is left-continuous and x 7→ x (v − x
2
)
is continuous, ψC(xn, v) converges
to ψC(x, v): therefore ψC(x, v) = M and x ∈ XC(v). Let us now consider case (ii). Since
C is non decreasing, it has a right limit at x denoted by C(x+) which is greater than
C(x). Taking the limit in the definition of ψC(xn, v), the value of ψC(xn, v) converges to
x
(
v − x
2
) − C(x+) ≤ x (v − x
2
) − C(x). Using the fact that ψC(xn, v) converges to M , we
conclude that C(x+) = C(x) and ψC(x, v) = M .
Now, let us show that XC is a non-decreasing correspondence. Let v1 < v2 in [−1; 1] and
x∗1 ∈ XC(v1) and x∗2 ∈ XC(v2). For any x ∈ [−1, 1]:
ψC(x, v2) = ψC(x, v1) + (v2 − v1)x.
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Using the fact that x∗1 ∈ XC(v1) and v1 < v2, for any x < x∗1,
ψC(x, v2) < ψC(x
∗
1, v1) + (v2 − v1)x∗1 = ψC(x∗1, v2).
By definition, ψC(x
∗
2, v2) ≥ ψC(x∗1, v2), thus x∗2 ≥ x∗1. Since this inequality holds for any
x∗1 ∈ XC(v1) and x∗2 ∈ XC(v2), we get that supXC(v1) ≤ inf XC(v2): the correspondence XC
is non-decreasing.
The combination of Lemmas 2 and 3 ensures that the maximiser of the IT’s expected profit
is unique except for a countable number of values of v:
Lemma 4 There exists a non-decreasing function XC such that for all v ∈ [−1, 1] except on
a countable set,
XC(v) = {XC(v)} .
All such XC agree outside of a countable set.
As we identify equilibria in a same equivalence class, as introduced in Definition 1, we
do not need to specify which particular XC we consider: we can unambiguously talk about
“a maximiser” of the expected profit. We are now ready to derive the main result of this
section.
3.3 Existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium of K(C)
We recast the statement of Theorem 4 by indicating what the equilibrium optimal demand
is:
Let C ∈ C and XC(v) be a maximiser of x 7→ x
(
v − x
2
) − C(x). Then (XC , P (XC)) is
an equilibrium of K(C). This is the unique equilibrium among the pairs (X,P ) such that
X : [−1, 1]→ [−1, 1] is non-decreasing.
Proof of Theorem 4. From Lemma 1, PˆC(x) =
x
2
for −xM ≤ x ≤ xM . Since XC(v)
is a maximiser of x
(
v − x
2
) − C(x), x = X(v) is an optimal response to the expected price
function Pˆ among all x ∈ [−xM , xM ]. To confirm that (XC , P (XC)) is an equilibrium,
we need to check what happens if the IT makes a choice outside of the candidate support
[−xM , xM ], knowing that the out-of-equilibrium pricing is defined by Assumption 2. Consider
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for instance the case x ∈ (xM , 1], as the case x ∈ [−1,−xM ] is identical by symmetry. Then
PˆC(x) =
1
2
∫ x+1
x−1
PC(z) dz
=
1
2
(x− xM) + 1
2
∫ xM+1
xM−1
PC(z) dz − 1
2
∫ x−1
xM−1
PC(z) dz
=
1
2
(x− xM) + PˆC(xM)− 1
2
∫ x−1
xM−1
PC(z) dz
=
1
2
(x− xM) + xM
2
− 1
2
∫ x−1
xM−1
PC(z) dz
=
x
2
. (16)
This is because when z ∈ [xM − 1, x − 1], z − 1 < x − 2 ≤ −1 ≤ −xM and z + 1 ≥ xM so
from (14), v|z is uniform over [−1, 1] and PC(z) = 0.
AsX(v) maximises x 7→ x (v − x
2
)−C(x), and PˆC(x) = x2 for x ∈ (xM , 1], X(v) maximises
x 7→ x
(
v − PˆC(x)
)
− C(x) over [−1, 1]: (XC , PC) is an equilibrium.
We now prove uniqueness. Let X ′ : [−1, 1]→ [−x′M , x′M ] be a non-decreasing strategy of
the IT. By Lemma 1, the expected price Pˆ ′ associated with X ′ is x
2
for x ∈ [−x′M , x′M ]. But
the computation of Pˆ ′ outside of [−x′M , xM ] is the same as the computation of PˆC in (16).
Hence, for all x ∈ [−1, 1], Pˆ ′(x) = x
2
. So, if (X ′, P (X ′)) is an equilibrium of K(C) such that
X ′ is non-decreasing, XC and X ′ maximise the same objective ψC over [−1; 1]. Since the
maximisers agree outside of a countable set, so do XC and X
′. In turn, we have P (X ′) = PC .
Hence, (XC , PC) and (X
′, P (X ′)) are the same equilibrium, which establishes uniqueness.
3.4 Examples of equilibria
In this section, we use Theorem 4 in order to understand how the presence of penalties affects
the trading strategy of the IT and the pricing function.
Consistent with intuition, penalties reduce the demand of the IT. By how much X(v) is
reduced depends on the functional form of the cost C and the realisation of v. This leads in
general to a non-linear demand schedule. In the following examples, we will illustrate some
important determinants of the IT demand.
The price function can be very flat in some regions and increase sharply in others. In
particular, the price impact of a marginal uninformed trade d
du
P (X(v)+u) strongly depends
on both the realisations of u and v. By constrast, in the mimicking equilibrium of the model
without penalties, this price impact is constant, regardless of the distributional assumptions
on the noise.
We consider three examples of penalty: quadratic, linear, and constant over large trades.
3.4.1 Quadratic cost
In this very particular instance, X remains linear after the introduction of the penalty.
Imposing quadratic costs is akin to increasing the perceived expected price impact. Since
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this cost is in x2 while the gross gains of trading are in x, the IT always trade as soon as
v 6= 0, and the magnitude of the trade increases with the absolute value of v. Note that the
result that X is linear can also obtain in a one-period Kyle model with Gaussian noises when
one makes one of the following assumptions: (i) there is a quadratic penalty on trading, (ii)
the insider is risk-averse instead of risk-neutral, (iii) the insider observes a signal imperfectly
correlated with v instead of observing v directly.
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Figure 3: Insider’s demand and pricing under quadratic penalty
C(x) = αx2, α = 0.125. Left panel: IT demand X. Right panel: price function P .
Due to the presence of the penalty, the insider trades less than in the linear mimicking
equilibrium, so that X(1) = xM < 1 (= 0.8 in this example).
When |d|≤ 1− xM(= 0.2), any demand of the IT is compatible with the observed aggregate
order, so all values v remain equally likely, as explained in section 3.1.2. No information
is incorporated and the price remains at the initial expected value of the asset: 0. When
d > 1 − xM , one knows that v has not realized at a very low value. This provides a lower
bound on v and the price becomes positive. As d increases, so do the lower bound and the
price, until d = 1 + xM(= 1.8). In that case, one knows for sure that the IT has placed an
order xM , which means that v = 1, and P reaches 1. The situation is symmetrical for values
of d below xM − 1(= −0.2).
3.4.2 Linear cost
When the penalty is linear, C(x) = α|x|, the maximisation program of the IT can be
rewritten as
maxx
(
(v − α)− x
2
)
.
If v ≥ α, one sees that a linear cost has the same effect as reducing the value of the
fundamental v by an amount α, and having no cost. Therefore, the strategy of the IT for
values v ∈ [α, 1] is a translation of the linear mimicking strategy over v ∈ [0, 1−α]. Similarly,
the strategy of the IT for values v ∈ [−1,−α] is a translation of the linear mimicking strategy
over v ∈ [α−1, 0]. This creates the two increasing linear segments in the left panel of Figure
15
4. In the flat middle section, v is not sufficient to cover the expected penalty and the IT
does not trade.
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Figure 4: Insider’s demand and pricing under linear penalty
C(x) = α|x|, α = 0.3. Left panel: IT demand X. Right panel: price function P .
The price function depicted in the right panel of Figure 4 exhibits a flat section in the
center surrounded by increasing linear segments. The intuition is exactly the same as in the
quadratic penalty case: when the magnitude of d is small (|d|≤ α(= 0.3)), all values of v
remain (equally) possible and no information is incorporated. As d grows, a lower bound
on v can be deduced and the price increases. The key difference with the quadratic penalty
case is that the price function jumps at d = ±1. Indeed, when d > 1, the market maker
knows for sure that the insider has placed a positive order. But the IT only does so when
v > α. By contrast, if d = 1−, X(v) = 0 remains possible, so we can only deduce that
v > −α(= −0.3). In terms of information incorporation, there is a huge difference between
d = 1+ and d = 1−.
3.4.3 Constant cost on trades of magnitude larger than x0
Absent penalties, the IT picks X(v) = v. Hence, if she is sanctionned only for trades of
magnitude larger than x0, she will not change her demand as long a |v|≤ x0: this corresponds
to the increasing linear section in the middle of Figure 5. For intermediate values of v, the
IT prefers to block her demand at the value x0 (or −x0) in order to avoid the penalty: this
corresponds to the flat sections in Figure 5. When v becomes large enough (|v|> √2K(≈
0.63)), the penalty is recouped in expectation by using the strategy that prevails in the
absence of costs: it appears as a sunk cost and the IT selects again the demand X(v) = v.
This corresponds to the increasing linear sections at the left and right of Figure 5.
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Figure 5: Insider’s demand and pricing under constant penalty on large trades
C(x) = KI|x|>x0 , K = 0.2, x0 = 0.1.
Left panel: IT demand X. Right panel: price function P .
The price function jumps at d = ±(1 − x0)(= ±0.9) and d = ±(1 + x0)(= ±1.1). The
intuition is as in the linear penalty case. When d exceeds 1 − x0, the MM knows that the
demand of the IT was larger than −x0 which rules out all values of v at the left of −
√
2K,
the left jump of X. Similarly, when d exceeds 1 + x0, the MM knows that the demand of
the IT was larger than x0, which rules out all values of v at the left of
√
2K, the right jump
of X.
A robustness exercise in the case of Gaussian noise is conducted in Appendix B.1 and shows
that most of the effects described above qualitatively subsist.
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4 Efficient frontier without a budget constraint
We now solve the regulatory problem laid out in section 2.2 by proving the following theorem:
Theorem 7 The equation of the efficient frontier is
S =
1√
3
(1 + 2G), −1
6
≤ G ≤ 0.
The set of regulations that implements the efficient frontier is exactly the class O defined as
O =
{
C ∈ C, ∃K ∈ [0, 1/2] , C(x) ≥ x
(√
2K − x
2
)
for 0 ≤ x ≤
√
2K,
C(x) = K for
√
2K < x ≤ 1
}
. (17)
When C ∈ O, the demand of the insider writes
XK(v) =
{
0 |v|≤ √2K
v |v|> √2K
for the K ∈ [0, 1/2] associated with C.
Figure 6 gives a graphical representation of functions in O.
If two penalties in O are associated with the same K, they implement the same demand
schedule XK . Moreover, it is easy to see that any point in the efficient frontier is implemented
by XK for exactly one value of K.
7 Therefore, K parametrizes the efficient frontier. Points
associated with a small (resp. large) K are selected by a regulator who puts more weight on
information incorporation (resp. on restricting the uninformed traders’ losses).
Any regulator that puts nonzero weight on both objectives must at least somewhat reduce
insider trading, but not totally. As we shall detail later, the optimal solution is to allow some
large trades for large realisations of |v|, because they incorporate a lot of information; more
precisely, the regulator wants to implement X(v) = v for large values of |v|. The cutoff point√
2K in the schedule XK then appears as the solution to the equation
v2
2
= K. (Recall that
v2
2
is the profit of the IT when there is no penalty). This characterizes the magnitude of v
above which the penalty appears as a sunk cost to the insider, who then effectively optimizes
as if there was no penalty and selects the mimicking demand X(v) = v.
With noise u ∼ U(−a, a) and v ∼ U(b, c) with a > 0 and b < c, one can conduct a similar
reasoning. By identifying the points where the mimicking strategy exactly compensates for
7A direct calculation shows that the P& L G of the uninformed traders under the demand XK is
− 16
(
1− (2K)3/2). Hence, the value of K that implements the point (G,S) of the efficient frontier is the
solution to G = − 16
(
1− (2K)3/2).
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the penalty K, we find that the cutoff points ±√2K become
b+ c
2
±
√
c− b
a
K.
Moreover, the maximal K we need to consider is the smallest one that suppresses net profits
even at the extreme realizations v ∈ {b, c}; so K is now varying in the interval [0, 1
4
a(c− b)].
Details can be found in Appendix A.1.
Figure 6: Some penalty functions in O.
The thick line represents the lower bound in the definition of O when K = 0.3 (then,√
2K ≈ 0.77) : any penalty inO must be above this line. Given that a penalty is symmetrical
and non-decreasing over [0, 1], the graph of a function in O must be included in the dotted
area. The two dashed lines represent two such functions.
4.1 Preliminary results on the regulator’s objective
Before characterizing the efficient frontier, we need to derive some useful formulas.
The expected net profit of the insider trader in state v is
piN(v) := X(v)(v − Pˆ (X(v)))− C(X(v)). (18)
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Note that in terms of the profit function ψC , the net profit is pi
N(v) = ψC(X(v), v).
The overall expected net profit (after fine, if any) is
ΠN := Ev[piN(v)]. (19)
The expected penalty that the insider undergoes is
F := E[C(X(v))].
The overall expected gross profit (before fine, if any) is
ΠT := ΠN + F = |G|. (20)
Observe that we can write
|G| =
∫ 1
0
X(v)
(
v − X(v)
2
)
dv =
∫ 1
0
v2
2
dv︸ ︷︷ ︸
1/6
−1
2
∫ 1
0
(v −X(v))2 dv. (21)
This way of seeing the expected losses of the uninformed traders as (an affine transformation
of) the L2 distance between X and the identity will be useful in section 5.1. We continue by
providing some convenient expressions of the quantities defined above.
Lemma 5 In equilibrium, the net profits satisfy
piN(v) =
∫ v
0
X(s) ds, (22)
ΠN =
∫ 1
0
(1− v)X(v) dv. (23)
Proof. Consider the parametrized objective function
ψC : [0, 1]× [0, 1]→ R
defined in (15). Notice that (i) ψC(x, .) is linear in v and therefore absolutely continuous, (ii)
|∂vψC(x, v)|= |x|≤ 1. (i) and (ii) guarantee that the assumptions of Theorem 2 in Milgrom
and Segal (2002) are satisfied. In the present case, this theorem tells us that we can write:
piN(v) = piN(0) +
∫ v
0
∂2ψC(X(s), s) ds
=
∫ v
0
X(s) ds,
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since the insider does not make any profit when the fundamental v is 0. Finally,
ΠN =
1
2
∫ 1
−1
piN(v) dv =
1
2
∫ 1
−1
∫ v
0
X(y) dy dv
=
∫ 1
0
∫ v
0
X(y) dy dv
=
∫ 1
0
(1− v)X(v) dv.
Lemma 6 expresses the expected post-trade standard deviation as a function of the demand
profile X. One consequence of this Lemma is that large orders associated with large values
of the fundamental are the ones that contribute the most to incorporating information into
prices. Indeed, the values of v such that the product vX(v) is large have the strongest
negative impact on S, as can be seen from (24). This provides intuition on why O is the
class of optimal penalties: when C ∈ O, the regulator knows that the IT will trade large
quantities should v realize at a large value because penalties are flat for large v. Although
costly for the uninformed traders, these orders are those that contribute the most to reducing
uncertainty about v, making the regulator unwilling to prevent them.
Lemma 6 The expected post-trade standard deviation satisfies
S =
1√
3
(
1−
∫ 1
0
vX(v) dv
)
. (24)
Proof. By the proof of Lemma 1, v|d is uniform over
IX(d) ≡ [(X−1` ((d− 1) ∨ (−xM)) ;X−1r ((d+ 1) ∧ xM))].
Since the standard deviation of a uniform variable over [a; b] equals 1
2
√
3
(b− a), Lemma 6 is
an immediate consequence of the following result: if X is an odd non-decreasing function
from [−1; 1] to [−xM ;xM ], then the expected length of the interval IX(X(v) + u) equals
2
(
1− ∫ 1
0
vX(v) dv
)
, which we must now prove.
For v ∈ [−1; 1], define
Yv = X
−1
r ((X(v) + u+ 1) ∧ xM)
Zv = X
−1
l ((X(v) + u− 1) ∨ (−xM)) .
What we need to prove is that Ev,u[Yv−Zv] = 2
(
1− ∫ 1
0
vX(v) dv
)
. By symmetry, Ev,u[Zv] =
−Ev,u[Yv], thus, it remains to prove that:
Ev,u[Yv] = 1−
∫ 1
0
vX(v) dv.
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Let us consider v fixed. The random variable Yv takes values in [−1, 1]: using Fubini theorem,
E[Yv] = E
[∫ 1
−1
I−1≤y≤Yv dy
]
− 1 =
∫ 1
−1
P (y ≤ Yv) dy − 1.
By definition of X−1r , if X(y) ≤ (X(v) + u + 1) ∧ xM then y ≤ Yv. Besides, if y < Yv, then
using the fact that X is non decreasing, X(y) ≤ (X(v) + u+ 1) ∧ xM . Thus:
{y ≤ Yv} \ {X(y) ≤ (X(v) + u+ 1) ∧ xM} ⊂ {y = Yv}.
Let us remark that Yv = y can hold for two different values of u if and only if X is discon-
tinuous at y or y = 1. In particular,
{y 6= 1|P(y = Yv) > 0} ⊂ {y|X(y−) 6= X(y+)}.
It follows from this discussion that :∣∣∣∣E[Yv]− ∫ 1−1 P(X(y) ≤ X(v) + u+ 1) dy + 1
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∫ 1−1 P(Yv = y) dy ≤ µ ({y|X(y−) 6= X(y+)}) ,
where µ is the Lebesgue measure on [−1, 1]. Since X is non-decreasing, it has a countable
number of discontinuity points. In particular µ ({y|X(y−) 6= X(y+)}) = 0 and:
E[Yv] =
∫ 1
−1
P(X(y) ≤ X(v) + u+ 1) dy − 1.
Now,
P(X(y) ≤ X(v) + u+ 1) = P(u ≥ X(y)−X(v)− 1)
= 1 +
(
1
2
(X(v)−X(y)) ∧ 0
)
.
Going back to the expression of E[Yv], we obtain
E[Yv] = 1− 1
2
∫ 1
v
X(y) dy +
1
2
(1− v)X(v).
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Integrating over v:
Ev,u[Yv] = 1− 1
4
∫ 1
−1
∫ 1
v
X(y) dy dv +
1
4
∫ 1
−1
(1− v)X(v) dv
= 1− 1
4
∫ 1
−1
(v + 1)X(v) dv +
1
4
∫ 1
−1
(1− v)X(v) dv
= 1− 1
2
∫ 1
−1
vX(v) dv
= 1−
∫ 1
0
vX(v) dv,
where in line 3, we used the fact that X is odd. This concludes the proof.
4.2 Characterization of the efficient frontier
4.2.1 Shape of the efficient frontier and efficient demand functions
In this section, we give the shape of the efficient frontier and explain what demand schedules
are compatible with it. We call these schedules efficient demand functions.
Lemma 7 Let C be a penalty function in C. In the equilibrium of K(C),
S ≥ 1√
3
(1 + 2G)
with equality if and only if there is v∗ ∈ [0, 1] such that X(v) = 0 for |v|< v∗ and X(v) = v
for |v|> v∗.
Proof. Due to Lemma 6, what we need to show is that
−
∫ 1
0
vX(v) dv ≥ −2
∫ 1
0
X(v)
(
v − X(v)
2
)
dv.
This is equivalent to ∫ 1
0
vX(v)dv ≥
∫ 1
0
X(v)2 dv,
or ∫ 1
0
X(v)(v −X(v)) dv ≥ 0 (25)
which holds because 0 ≤ X(v) ≤ v for v ∈ [0; 1].
For the equality to hold, it is necessary and sufficient to have X(v) = 0 or X(v) = v almost
everywhere. Since X is non-decreasing, it is equivalent to X(v) = 0 for |v|< v∗ and X(v) = v
for |v|> v∗, where v∗ = sup{v, X(v) = 0}.
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Equation (25) is particularly convenient because it immediately indicates what type of de-
mand function is needed to implement the efficient frontier. Of course, X is an endogenous
outcome: what remains to be seen is what regulations implement the efficient demand func-
tions.
4.2.2 Implementation of the efficient demand functions
Lemma 8 The efficient demand functions derived in Lemma 7 are implemented exactly by
the penalties C ∈ O.
By construction, penalties in O are flat for large values of |v| and increase quickly as |v|
departs from 0 (see Figure 6). Intuitively, this is what is required to implement the efficient
demand functions. Indeed, when |v| realizes at a small value, the marginal impact of increas-
ing demand on the expected penalty is large, and the IT prefers to refrain from trading. For
|v| large, however, the penalty schedule being flat on large demands, a large order allows to
cover the expected fine, which appears as a sunk cost. The IT then optimizes as in the linear
mimicking equilibrium and demands X(v) = v. The proof of the Lemma can be found in
Appendix A.
4.2.3 Proof of Theorem 7, illustrations and discussions
The proof of Theorem 7 is complete: Lemma 7 characterizes the efficient frontier and due
to Lemma 8, achieving the efficient frontier can only be done by selecting a cost C ∈ O,
characterized by a K ∈ [0, 1/2].
Note that by varying K between 0 and 1
2
, one clearly covers the full efficient frontier. As
K increases, the losses (−G) of the uninformed traders decrease from ∫ 1
0
v2
2
dv = 1
6
≈ 0.167 to
0, while the expected post-trade standard deviation increases from 1√
3
(1−2/6) = 2
3
√
3
≈ 0.385
to 1√
3
≈ 0.577.
Each point of Figure 7 corresponds to a penalty function C; it represents the outcomes
(S,−G) in the unique equilibrium of K(C). The losses of the uninformed traders, −G, read
on the x-axis. The expected post-trade standard deviation, S, reads on the y-axis. For a
fixed y-coordinate (a fixed S) the preferred option of the regulator is to select a point with
the smallest x-coordinate (that minimises −G).
Consistent with Theorem 7, penalties in O achieve the efficient frontier, which is linear
as indicated by Lemma 7.
Outcomes (S,−G) corresponding to quadratic and linear penalties (C(x) = αx2, C(x) =
α|x| for varying α ≥ 0) are also reported in Figure 7. As one can see, they perform signifi-
cantly worse than penalties C ∈ O. This is also the case of penalties with no cost on small
trades and big costs on large trades, C(x) = KHI|x|>x0 . Here KH is a constant large enough
so that the insider never chooses to trade more than x0. The fact that these particular
penalty functions perform poorly compared to penalties in O is consistent with the intuition
given above Lemma 6. Indeed, they imply that X(v) = v for |v| small and X(v) = 0 for |v|
large (the opposite of the demand functions implied by C ∈ O), so that the reduction of the
expected standard deviation, measured by the term
∫ 1
0
vX(v) dv (see Lemma 6), is low.
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Figure 7: Locus of (S,−G) for some penalty functions.
Figure 7 shows that quadratic costs are the most inefficient among the considered costs. In
fact, they have the worst performance among all penalty functions :
Proposition 1 Quadratic penalties implement the upper frontier of the locus of outcomes
(S,G) generated by all penalty functions in C, i.e. they induce the highest possible expected
post-trade standard deviation for a given P & L of the uninformed traders.
Proof. See Appendix A.
In Appendix B.2, we repeat numerically the construction of Figure 7 in the case of Gaussian
noise: u, v ∼ N(0, 1) and obtain similar results.
25
5 Efficient frontiers under a budget constraint
So far, by imposing virtually no restriction on the set of admissible penalties, our analysis
potentially assumes away a real-world constraint on the regulator: investigation costs. Con-
ducting investigations requires time, financial and human resources. How do the regulator’s
efficient policies change in that case?
In section 5.1, we consider the case of non-pecuniary penalties: the regulator cannot balance
its budget by collecting fines. This translates into a bound on the investigation probability,
which in turn caps the maximal expected penalty that can be imposed an insider trades. In
section 5.2, we study pecuniary fines. In that case, the regulator needs to collect at least
some fines to balance its budget. This constraint forces the regulator to select “intermediate”
levels of penalties: if C is too small, not enough fines are collected, but the same holds if C
is too large, as this induces insider traders to refrain from trading.
5.1 Non-pecuniary penalties
We maintain the assumption that investigation occurs with a constant probability, α, leaving
the analysis of the case where α is a function of an observable (e.g. the aggregate order)
for future research. We also suppose that the regulator cannot use fines to relax its budget
constraint. This is the case as soon as penalties are non-pecuniary, e.g. an imprisonment
sentence.
5.1.1 Setup and Characterization of the efficient frontier
With an investigation cost κ, since the expected expenses of the regulator are given by ακ,
and denoting the alloted budget B, we consider the constraint
ακ ≤ B. (26)
Note that the insider trader optimizes under an expected penalty schedule C = αC˜, where C˜
is the actual sanction conditional on investigation success. Absent a cap on C˜, the regulator
could trivially get around its budget constraint by reducing α and increasing C˜. We would
be back to the case studied in section 4. There are, however, several reasons that justify
the existence of a bound on C˜. The first one is simply that the worst possible sanction,
say lifetime imprisonment, does not provide −∞ utility. Another rationale comes from the
fact that the stronger a sanction, the harder it is to implement it, as the legally required
amount of evidence increases. For instance, in the Netherlands at the end of the XXth
century, a very strong penalization of insider trading was enforced, which actually led to a
quasi-impossibility to convict people of insider trading.8 From (26), with a cap C˜M on C˜,
the insider trader faces an expected penalty
C = αC˜ ≤ K := B
κ
C˜M . (27)
8This is documented in SEC (1998).
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The constraint on C, equation (27), means that we now work with a restricted set of
admissible penalties:9
Definition 8 In the non-pecuniary case, the set of admissible penalties with a budget con-
straint is
CK = {C ∈ C, C(1) ≤ K}.
Note that C(1) ≤ K is equivalent to (27) because any penalty in C is symmetrical and
non-decreasing over [0, 1]. Moreover, the budget constraint is an actual constraint for K ∈
[0, 1/2); for K ≥ 1/2, CK = C.
What happens when one restricts the set of admissible penalties? First, some previously
efficient points may no longer be feasible. Second, some points that were not previously
efficient may no longer be dominated by any point still implementable under the budget
constraint. We recast Definition 2 in this new setting:
Definition 9 In the non-pecuniary case, the efficient frontier under a budget constraint is
the set of points (G,S) implementable by a penalty in CK that are not dominated by any
point implementable by a penalty in CK.
As discussed above, the introduction of a constraint on the set of admissible penalties
should in general make new efficient points appear. Consider for instance the situation
depicted in panel (a) of Figure 8. The dotted region represents the set of feasible points
under the constraint. Points of the previously efficient frontier (oblique straight line) at the
right of the dashed line are still feasible and therefore still efficient. Those at the left on the
dashed line are not implementable anymore. The lower frontier of the blue area is the new
efficient frontier. In particular, new efficient points appear at the left of the dashed line.
By contrast, in panel (b), there are no feasible points at the left of the dashed line: the
efficient frontier is truncated.
9 Of course, we could obtain the same constraint by ignoring investigation costs, setting α = 1 and
assuming that the cap C˜M on C˜ = C is below 1/2. The idea here is that if investigation was systematic,
the bound C˜M would likely be non-binding. It only becomes binding because investigation is costly, which
reduces the expected penalty that the IT faces. The extent to which it binds depends on the budget-relevant
parameters B and κ: see (27).
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Figure 8: Introduction of a constraint: two possible scenarios.
It is a priori quite unclear in which situation we are. Denote
OK = O ∩ CK .
OK is the set of efficient penalties derived in section 4.2.2, that are still feasible under the
budget constraint. These penalties are still efficient under the budget constraint. Moreover,
by direct computation, we obtain that as C varies in OK , |G| describes the interval[
|G|min(K), 1
6
]
,
where
|G|min(K) := 1
6
(
1− (2K)3/2) . (28)
The truncature of the previously efficient frontier at the right (in the (|G|, S) plane) of
|G|min(K) is part of the efficient frontier under the budget constraint. In light of the discus-
sion above, the key question is to know what happens at the left of |G|min(K). Theorem 11
shows that no penalty in CK can implement |G|< |G|min(K) (i.e. we are in the situation of
panel (b)).
This immediately implies the characterisation of the constrained efficient frontier:
Theorem 10 The efficient frontier under the constraint C ≤ K is the truncature |G| ≥
|G|min(K) of the efficient frontier of Theorem 7 and is implemented exactly by penalties in
OK.
Theorem 10 is a consequence of the following:
Theorem 11 Let K ≤ 1/2. Under the constraint C ≤ K, the expected losses of the unin-
formed traders are at least
|G|≥ |G|min(K).
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This lower bound is attained by the demand schedules Xα for 0 ≤ α ≤ 1−
√
2K and by the
Xα only, where
Xα(v) =

v 0 ≤ v ≤ α
α α < v ≤ α +√2K
v v > α +
√
2K
−Xα(−v) v < 0.
These demand schedules are implemented by the penalties Cα where Cα(x) = KI|x|>α.
Theorem 11 shows that one cannot implement |G| < |G|min(K) with C ∈ CK and provides
penalty functions Cα that achieve |G| = |G|min(K). While the Cα imply the same expected
losses of the uninformed traders, they all imply different expected post-trade standard devi-
ations. In particular, all the Cα for α 6= 0 are not efficient penalties.
We supplement the proof with several discussions, and therefore present it in a separate
section.
5.1.2 Proof of Theorem 11 and intuition
Step 1 : transformation of the problem into a constrained problem of L2 distance maximisa-
tion.
Recall equation (21):
|G| = 1
6
− 1
2
∫ 1
0
(v −X(v))2 dv.
This means that obtaining the bound of the Theorem is equivalent to showing
max
C∈CK
∫ 1
0
(v −X(v))2 dv = (2K)
3/2
3
, (29)
subject to the constraint that X(v) maximises the net profit ψC(., v).
Let g(v) = v −X(v), so that we are looking for an upper bound of ∫ 1
0
g2. By Lemma 5 and
under the constraint C ≤ K, we obtain:
∫ 1
0
g =
∫ 1
0
v dv −
∫ 1
0
X(v) dv
=
1
2
− piN(1)
≤ K. (30)
This is because, when v = 1, the IT can achieve at least a net profit of 1
2
− C(1) ≥ 1
2
−K.
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Therefore, the maximum in (29) is less or equal to
sup
∫ 1
0
g2
subject to the constraints (i)
∫ 1
0
g ≤ K, and (ii) g(0) = 0 ≤ g(v) and v 7→ v − g(v) is
non-decreasing. (i) comes from (30), and (ii) is an immediate consequence of the properties
of an optimal demand schedule X.
Notice how crucial Lemma 5 is, and therefore how effective the result of Milgrom and Segal
(2002) is. Once noted that C(1) ≤ K implies a lower bound on the net profit at 1, Lemma 5
allows (i) to incorporate the constraint the X is a maximiser in a parsimonious way, (ii) to
reduce the two constraints — C ≤ K and X must maximise ψC —, into a single condition,∫
g ≤ K, which is particularly convenient, as it is a L1 bound in a L2 maximisation problem.
Absent the fact that X must be non-decreasing, which translates into the fact that v 7→ v−
g(v) is non-decreasing, the maximisation of
∫
g2 subject to
∫
g = K (and 0 ≤ g(v) ≤ v) would
be standard: to “spread mass as unenvenly as possible”, one would pick g(v) = vIv≥v∗ with∫ 1
v∗ v dv = K. This is not feasible, however, because it violates the monotonicity constraint.
The gα : v 7→ v −Xα(v) are then natural candidate maximisers, as they are constructed in
a similar spirit of variance maximisation, but respect the monotonicity constraint.
The gα all have the same L
2 norm, but are away from zero over different intervals. This
hints at the fact that for a general function g, when trying to find a bound on
∫
g2, we will
have no way to know where g must be small or large, and therefore little grip on g. The
idea is then to consider the repartition function ϕ of g, because (i) one can reconstruct the
moments of g with those of ϕ (see Step 3) and (ii) it does not matter where g is large, only
how often it is large. In fact, all the gα have the same repartition function, which suggests
that this is the correct perspective to adopt.
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Figure 9: Using the repartition function to transform g
For any function f and x 6= y, let
τx,yf =
f(y)− f(x)
y − x .
Since X is non-decreasing, we have
τx,yg ≤ 1 (31)
for all x 6= y. Now, define
ϕ(z) = µ ({x, g(x) ≥ z}) .
Step 2 : (31) implies
τx,yϕ ≤ −1 (32)
for all x < y such that ϕ(y) > 0.
g is subject to a monotonicity constraint (namely v 7→ v − g(v) must be non-decreasing),
which we need to transform into a constraint for ϕ. Clearly, if g increases at speed 1, ϕ
decreases at speed 1. What we show here is that if g increases at speed less than 1 then ϕ
decreases at speed larger than 1.
Since y > 0, the set {u, g(u) ≥ y} is nonempty, so we can consider
u+ = inf{u, g(u) ≥ y}.
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Since g(0) = 0 ≤ x we can also define
u− = sup{u ≤ u+, g(u) ≤ x}.
Because of (31), the function g can not jump upwards, hence g(u−) = x and g(u+) = y. By
construction of u− and u+, we have:
[u−, u+) ⊂ {u, g(u) ∈ [x, y)}. (33)
Since τu−,u+g ≤ 1, we have:
u+ − u− ≥ g(u+)− g(u−) = y − x, (34)
We can now obtain (32):
τx,yϕ =
µ ({u, g(u) ≥ y})− µ ({u, g(u) ≥ x})
y − x
= −µ ({u, g(u) ∈ [x, y)})
y − x
≤ −µ ([u
−, u+))
y − x
≤ −1.
Line 3 uses (33) and Line 4 is a consequence of (34).
Step 3 : expression of the moments of g as a function of the moments of ϕ.
Recall that ∫ 1
0
g =
∫ 1
0
ϕ∫ 1
0
g2 = 2
∫ 1
0
yϕ(y) dy. (35)
Indeed, ∫ 1
0
g2(y) dy =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
I0≤s≤g2(y) ds dy
=
∫ 1
0
µ
({
u, g2(u) ≥ s}) ds
=
∫ 1
0
µ
({
u, g(u) ≥ √s}) ds
= 2
∫ 1
0
yϕ(y) dy,
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by using the change of variable y =
√
s. The other equality in (35) is proven similarly.
Step 4 : translation into a functional maximisation problem with respect to the transform ϕ.
Using the previous discussion,
sup
C∈CK
∫ 1
0
(v −X(v))2 dv ≤ 2 sup
ϕ∈Φ≤K
∫ 1
0
yϕ(y) dy
≤ 2 sup
ϕ∈ΦK
∫ 1
0
yϕ(y) dy (36)
where Φ≤K is the set of measurable functions
{
ϕ : [0, 1]→ [0, 1], sup
x,y
τx,yϕ ≤ −1,
∫ 1
0
ϕ(y) dy ≤ K
}
and ΦK = {ϕ ∈ Φ≤K ,
∫ 1
0
ϕ = K}. Clearly, in (36) the right-hand-side of Line 1 equals the
term in Line 2.
Define ϕK(z) = max
{√
2K − z, 0
}
for 0 ≤ z ≤ 1. Note that ϕK ∈ ΦK . If ϕ ∈ ΦK ,
ϕ(0) ≥ ϕK(0). Otherwise, using the fact that τ0,yϕ ≤ −1,
ϕ(y) ≤ ϕ(0)− y < ϕK(0)− y ≤ ϕK(y).
Hence,
∫ 1
0
ϕ(y) dy would be strictly less than K =
∫ 1
0
φK(y) dy.
Define ∆ = ϕ − ϕK : we proved that ∆(0) > 0. Besides, by construction,
∫ 1
0
∆(y) dy = 0.
Define
y0 = inf {y, ∆(y) ≤ 0} .
Because τy0,yϕ ≤ −1, we have ∆(y) ≤ 0 for y > y0 and ∆(y) ≥ 0 for y < y0. Hence:∫ 1
0
yϕ(y) dy −
∫ 1
0
yϕK(y) dy =
∫ 1
0
y∆(y) dy
=
∫ y0
0
y∆(y) dy +
∫ 1
y0
y∆(y) dy
≤ y0
∫ y0
0
∆(y) dy + y0
∫ 1
y0
∆(y) dy ≤ 0.
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Figure 10: The transform ϕ of a maximiser g must be ϕK .
(i) Starting from a point ϕ(0) < ϕK(0) (lowest thick dot on the y-axis), ϕ (solid black curved
line) remains below the dotted line and its integral is therefore smaller than the area of the
grey region, itself below K. (ii) After crossing ϕK , ϕ must remain below ϕK . Here, the
crossing occurs through a downwards jump of ϕ.
Thus, the supremum in (36) is attained only by the function ϕK and equal to
2
∫ 1
0
yϕK(y) dy =
∫ √2K
0
y(
√
2K − y) dy
=
(2K)3/2
3
,
which establishes the bound of the Theorem.
Step 5 : The maximum in (29) is attained exclusively by the demand schedules (Xα)α∈[0,1−√2K]
defined in the Theorem.
First, it is easy to see that these demand schedules achieve the maximum in (29). It remains
to show that they are the only one to do so. Let X be a demand schedule obtained under
a penalty C ∈ C, C ≤ K. Let us suppose that it achieves the maximum in (29). Consider,
as in step 2, the function ϕ associated with g(v) = v − X(v). The function ϕ is then a
supremum of (36) and by step 3, ϕ = ϕK . Since
sup
x
g(x) ≥ sup{x, ϕ(x) > 0} = sup{x, ϕK(x) > 0} =
√
2K,
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the supremum of g(v) is at least
√
2K. Let us remark that:
sup
v
g(v) = sup
v
sup
s∈[0,v]
g(s).
Since τ.,.g ≤ 1, the function g(v) = sups∈[0,v] g(s) is continuous: the supremum of g(v) and
thus of g(v) is attained at a point v0. Since τ.,.g ≤ 1, v0 ≥
√
2K and for v ∈ [v0 −
√
2K, v0],
g(v) ≥ v − v0 +
√
2K. Since g ≥ 0, we obtain∫ 1
0
g ≥
∫ v0
v0−
√
2K
g
≥
∫ v0
v0−
√
2K
(v − v0 +
√
2K) dv
≥ K
with equality if and only if g = 0 outside [v0 −
√
2K, v0] and g(v) = v − v0 +
√
2K over
[v0 −
√
2K, v0]. But there must be equality because g ∈ ΦK . Hence g has the above form,
and the demand function X, given by X(v) = v − g(v), is equal to Xα as stated in the
Theorem, with α = v0 −
√
2K.
Step 6 : It is easy to see that the demand schedules Xα are implemented by the penalties
Cα. This allows to conclude the proof of the Theorem.
One consequence of Theorem 10 is that it is not possible to infer from a regulator’s choice of
penalty whether she is constrained or not. In the non-pecuniary case, a regulator subject to
a binding budget constraint effectively behaves like an unconstrained regulator that would
assign less weight to curtailing the losses of the uninformed traders. In the next section,
we study the case of pecuniary penalties and show that, by contrast to the previous result,
the introduction of the constraint creates new efficient points. In theory, observing that the
regulator has selected one of these points would imply that she is constrained.
5.2 Pecuniary penalties
We now consider pecuniary penalties, collected by the regulator. For simplicity, we main-
tain the assumption of a constant α and assume that a potential cap on C˜ does not bind.
We suppose that the regulator must have a balanced budget in expectation. The budget
constraint (26) transforms into
ακ ≤ B + E[C(X(v))]. (37)
If B ≥ ακ, since we assume that a potential cap on C˜ is not binding, there is no constraint,
and we are back to the case studied in section 4. The interesting case is therefore B < ακ.
Definition 12 The efficient surface Σ is the locus of points (G,S, F ) generated by any C ∈ C
such that no C ′ ∈ C can weakly (i) increase G, (ii) decrease S, (iii) increase F with at least
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one among (i), (ii) or (iii) being in fact strictly.
Recall that G, S and F denote respectively the P & L of the uninformed traders, the ex-
pected post-trade standard deviation and the expected collected fine. When convenient, we
use the notations G(X), S(X) or F (X) to say that the quantities are implied by the demand
schedule X.
5.2.1 Characterization of the efficient surface
Let J be the set of indices
J :=
{
(x, y), 0 ≤ y
1 + y
≤ x ≤ y ≤ 1
}
.
Theorem 13 A parametric equation of the efficient surface Σ in the space (G,S, F ) is{(
1
6
(v21v2 − 1);
1√
3
(
2
3
+
1
6
(v21v2 + v1v
2
2)
)
;
v1v2
6
(3− 2v1 − v2)
)}
(v1,v2)∈J
and it is achieved exactly by the demand schedules (Xv1,v2)(v1,v2)∈J where
Xv1,v2(v) =

0 v ∈ [0, v1]
v2
v2−v1 (v − v1) v ∈ (v1, v2]
v v ∈ (v2, 1]
−Xv1,v2(−v) v < 0.
These demand functions can be implemented by the penalties (Cv1,v2)(v1,v2)∈J ∈ C where
Cv1,v2(x) =
{
v1|x|− v12v2x2 |x|≤ v2
v1v2
2
|x|> v2.
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Figure 11: The efficient surface Σ.
Figure 12: Efficient demand schedule and penalty function under a budget constraint
with pecuniary fines.
There is a key difference in proving Theorem 11 and Theorem 13. Here, the most natural
candidate optimiser of the weighted objective, i.e. the pointwise minimiser, turns out to
be an implementable demand schedule. Since pointwise minimisation is a simple task, the
proof of Theorem 13 is fairly straightforward. Such an approach was not possible in proving
Theorem 11.
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Proof. As a consequence of Lemma 5, in equilibrium the expected fine satisfies
E[C(X(v))] =
∫ 1
0
X(v)
(
v − X(v)
2
)
dv −
∫ 1
0
(1− v)X(v) dv,
and we are working under a constraint E[C(X(v))] ≥ K1.
By Lemma 6, an upper bound constraint on the expected post-trade standard deviation
translates into a constraint ∫ 1
0
vX(v)dv ≥ K2.
This leads us to consider the following minimisation problem:
min
X
∫ 1
0
X(v)
(
v − X(v)
2
)
dv + γ
(
K1 −
∫ 1
0
X(v)
(
v − X(v)
2
)
dv +
∫ 1
0
(1− v)X(v) dv
)
+ η
(
K2 −
∫ 1
0
vX(v) dv
)
,
for some weights γ, η ≥ 0. Gathering terms, we obtain that this program is equivalent to
min
X
∫ 1
0
X(v)
(
γ + (1− 2γ − η)v + γ − 1
2
X(v)
)
dv (38)
For 0 ≤ v ≤ 1, define
Pv : [0, v] → R
x 7→ x
(
γ + (1− 2γ − η)v + γ − 1
2
x
)
Case 1: γ > 1. Pv is the restriction to [0, v] of a second-order polynomial with positive
leading coefficient. Therefore it reaches its minimum at either 0, v, or when the first order
condition is satisfied, say at x0(v), and x0(v) achieves the minimum as soon as 0 ≤ x0(v) ≤ v.
Given that
x0(v) =
(2γ + η − 1)v − γ
γ − 1 ,
algebra shows that
arg max Pv =

0 v ≤ γ
2γ+η−1
x0(v)
γ
2γ+η−1 ≤ v ≤ γγ+η
v v > γ
γ+η
.
Let v1 =
γ
2γ+η−1 and v2 =
γ
γ+η
. We have obtained that with the function Xv1,v2 given in the
Theorem, the equality
arg maxPv = Xv1,v2(v)
holds. Direct calculations show that Xv1,v2 is implemented by Cv1,v2 . This means that we
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have found an implementable demand schedule that maximises the integral in (38) pointwise,
which implies that Xv1,v2 is a minimiser of the program (38), and it is the only one because
the pointwise minimisation of the integral in (38) has a unique solution.
Case 2: γ ≤ 1. Pv is now either linear or with a negative leading coefficient, meaning that
its minimum is attained either at 0 or v. Algebra shows that arg maxPv = v (for 0 ≤ v ≤ 1)
if and only if
γ + 2η ≥ 1 (39)
and
v ≥ v∗ := γ
η + 3γ
2
− 1
2
,
where, by condition (39), v∗ ∈ [0, 1]. With v1 = v2 = v∗ we conclude as before that Xv1,v2
is the unique minimiser of (38). Finally, if (39) is not satisfied, the minimiser of (38) is
identically zero, which corresponds to X1,1 defined in the Theorem.
Finally, it is easy to see that the (v1, v2) constructed above describe the set J as γ, η ≥ 0
vary, and J is the family of indices specified in the Theorem. So any index in J corresponds
to an efficient demand function. This shows that (Xv1,v2)(v1,v2)∈J is the family of efficient
demand functions.
The proof is complete, because the set of maxima we obtain as γ, η ≥ 0 vary is connected,
which implies that we have found all the points of the efficient surface.
5.2.2 Efficient (G,S) frontiers for various regulator’s budgets
Assume that the regulator has budget B, which translates into a constraint
F = E[C(X(v))] ≥ Fmin := ακ−B.
Definition 14 The Fmin-efficient frontier is the set of non-dominated points in
F(Fmin) := {(G(X), S(X)), Ximplemented by some C ∈ C with E[C(X(v))] ≥ Fmin} .
We can now construct the Fmin-efficient frontiers from the efficient surface Σ (denote piGS :
(G,S, F ) 7→ (G,S) the projection on the (G,S)-plane):
Lemma 9 The Fmin-efficient frontier is the set of points of piGS (Σ ∩ {F ≥ Fmin}) that are
not dominated in piGS (Σ ∩ {F ≥ Fmin}).
Proof. See Appendix A.
This means that to obtain the Fmin-efficient frontier, one must first project the relevant
points (G,S, F ) of Σ, and then select those that are efficient in the plane (note that this
second step is necessary, as the projection of a point of the efficient surface will in general
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not be a point of the efficient frontier). Σ was found by solving an optimization problem,
from which the Fmin-efficient frontiers are deduced geometrically: we do not need to solve
again a minimisation problem.
We are now in a position to provide the Fmin-efficient frontiers: see Figure 13.
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Figure 13: Efficient (|G|, S) frontiers under various constraints F ≥ Fmin.
An important difference emerges with respect to the case of non-pecuniary penalties studied
above. Here, the efficient frontiers are not truncatures of the frontier that obtains absent
the constraint. Of course, the penalties in O that implement F ≥ Fmin are still part of the
Fmin-efficient frontier, but new constrained efficient points emerge (dotted arcs), which are
associated with penalty functions and demand schedules that were not previously optimal.
The Fmin efficient frontier does not even intersect the unconstrained frontier for Fmin very
large. To see why, note that the maximal expected fine under a penalty in O is
max{F (X), X implemented byC ∈ O} = max
0≤K≤1/2
K
(
1−
√
2K
)
=
2
27
≈ 0.074, attained byK = 2
9
.
This means that if Fmin >
2
27
, no penalty in O allows to balance the regulator’s budget.
In fact, a penalty that provides the highest expected fine (regardless of S and G) is C 1
2
,1
(defined in Theorem 13), and it gives F = 1
12
.
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From Lemma 9, we know that points of the Fmin-efficient frontier correspond to points in Σ,
which means that they are associated with demand schedules of the form Xv1,v2 defined in
Theorem 13. To understand how the budget constraint F ≥ Fmin modifies the nature of the
optimal strategies, Figure 14 plots the (v1, v2) used on the Fmin-efficient frontier for various
values of Fmin.
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Figure 14: Indices (v1, v2) of the efficient demand functions Xv1,v2 associated with var-
ious constraints F ≥ Fmin.
As an illustration, the red filled dot, which corresponds to (v1, v2) ≈ (0.48, 0.61) represents
the demand schedule X0.48,0.61 (where Xv1,v2 is defined in Theorem 13) and indicates that this
demand schedule implements one point of the efficient frontier when the budget constraint
of the regulator is such that Fmin = 0.07.
When Fmin = 0, we obtain the line v2 = v1, in which case Xv1,v2 is implemented by a penalty
C ∈ O, consistent with section 4.2.2. We observe that as Fmin increases, one needs to widen
the gap v2 − v1. The intuition is that the linear section over [v1, v2] of the demand schedule
Xv1,v2 best resolves the trade off between large fines and large trade volumes of the insider
trader and allows to collect a relatively high amount of fines in expectation. As an example,
recall that the demand schedule that implies the highest expected fine (1/12) had v2−v1 = 12 .
When the regulator must balance its budget through the collection of pecuniary fines, some
previously optimal strategies are no longer feasible as they do not induce the insider trader
to pay enough fines in expectation. New constrained efficient points appear, and the class
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of efficient penalties is modified, as well as the equilibrium demand schedules and price
functions.
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Figure 15: New patterns of price functions.
v1 = 0.5 and v2 = 0.75.
Figure 15 compares the price functions implied by a demand schedule efficient absent a
budget constraint, Xv2,v2 and a constrained efficient demand schedule Xv1,v2 . Contrary to
P (Xv2,v2), P (Xv1,v2) has no flat sections and is everywhere increasing. In particular, in the
unconstrained case, the random price is partly discrete: with positive probability, it will be
equal to one of the ordinates of the flat sections of P (Xv2,v2). Conversly, in the case of a
strong budget constraint, the random price has a continuous density.
References
Bagnoli, M., S. Viswanathan, and C. Holden (2001): “On the Existence of Linear
Equilibria in Models of Market Marking,” Mathematical Finance, 11(1), 1–31.
42
Boulatov, A., A. Kyle, and D. Livdan (2013): “Uniqueness of Equilibrium in the
single period Kyle ’85 model,” Working paper.
Kyle, A. (1985): “Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading,” Econometrica, 53(6), 1315–
1335.
McLennan, A., P. Monteiro, and R. Tourky (2017): “On uniqueness of equilibrium
in the Kyle model,” Math. Finan. Econ., 11, 161–172.
Milgrom, P., and I. Segal (2002): “Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets,”
Econometrica, 70(2), 583–601.
Rochet, J.-C., and J.-L. Vila (1994): “Insider Trading without Normality,” Review of
Economic Studies, 61, 131–152.
SEC (1998): “Insider Trading: A US Perspective,” Speech by SEC Staff.
A Additional Proofs
A.1 Normalization of supports to [−1, 1]
Assume u ∼ U(−a, a) and v ∼ U(b, c) with a > 0 and b < c. We want to map an
equilibrium with these noise terms and penalty C to an equilibrium with normalized noises.
Let C0(x0) = 1
σ
C(ax0) for −1 ≤ x0 ≤ 1. C0 defines a penalty in C.
Let (X0, P 0) be an equilibrium of K(C0) under uniform noises distributed over [−1, 1], and
admissible demands I0 = [−1, 1]. Let Φ be the linear application mapping [b, c] to [−1, 1]:
Φ(v) =
2
c− bv −
c+ b
c− b
Similar to Lemma 1, the expected price function must be Pˆ (x) = m+ σx
2a
where
m =
b+ c
2
,
σ =
c− b
2
.
For any v ∈ [b, c], the maximisation program of the IT is
max
x∈[−a,a]
x
(
v −m− σ
2a
x
)
− C(x).
This can be rewritten as
max
x0∈[−1,1]
(ax0)
(
v −m− σ
2a
(ax0)
)
− C(ax0).
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Or:
(aσ) max
x0∈[−1,1]
x0
(
v/σ −m/σ − x
0
2
)
− C0(x0),
By definition ofX0, the solution of this program is given byX0
(
v−m
σ
)
= X0 (Φ(v)). Recalling
that the actual demand of the IT is x = ax0, we obtain
X(v) = aX0
(
v −m
σ
)
= aX0 (Φ(v)) .
We can also express the price function using P 0. Since Φ is linear, we can write
P (d) = E[v|d]
= Φ−1 (E [Φ(v)|X(v) + u = d])
= Φ−1
(
E
[
Φ(v)|aX0(Φ(v)) + a(u/a) = d])
= Φ−1
(
E
[
v0|X0(v0) + u0 = d/a])
= Φ−1
(
P 0(d/a)
)
,
because v0 = Φ(v) and u0 = u/a are independent U(−1, 1) variables.
So the equilibrium with noises u ∼ U(−a, a) and v ∼ U(b, c), penalty C and admissible
demands I = [−a, a] can be mapped to the equilibrium of K(C0) with normalized noises and
admissible demands I0 = [−1, 1]. By the same procedure, one can do the reverse mapping.
Absent penalties, X(v) = 2a
c−bv − a c+bc−b and the profit at v is given by
X(v)
(
v − b+ c
2
− c− b
4a
X(v)
)
=
a
c− b
(
v − c+ b
2
)2
.
This recoups a cost K as soon as v is outside
b+ c
2
±
√
c− b
a
K,
and is maximal when v ∈ {b, c}, where it equals 1
4
a(c− b).
Finally, we note that the model quantities of interest (S, G and F ) are mapped one-
to-one and ranked identically regardless of the chosen supports, i.e. the assertions “S <
S ′”,“G < G′” or “F < F ′” do not depend on which supports we consider. Therefore, the
choice of [−1, 1] as the support of the noises is without loss of generality once we assume
uniform distributions and a centered uninformed traders’ demand.
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A.2 Proposition 1
Using Lemma 6, we can write
−G =
∫ 1
0
X(v)
(
v − X(v)
2
)
dv
= 1−
√
3S − 1
2
∫ 1
0
X(v)2 dv. (40)
By Cauchy-Schwarz inequality(∫ 1
0
vX(v)dv
)2
≤
∫ 1
0
v2dv
∫ 1
0
X(v)2 dv (41)
≤ 1
3
∫ 1
0
X(v)2 dv
−1
2
∫ 1
0
X(v)2 dv ≤ −3
2
(∫ 1
0
vX(v)
)2
dv = −3
2
(1−
√
3S)2.
Plugging this into (40), we obtain
G ≥
√
3S − 1 + 3
2
(1−
√
3S)2. (42)
This inequality determines the highest possible S given G. But there is equality in (42)
if and only if there is equality in the Cauchy-Schwarz bound (41). This is the case if and
only if the two functions in the left-hand side are colinear, i.e. if X(v) is proportional to v:
X(v) = βv. Since 0 ≤ X(v) ≤ 1 for 0 ≤ v ≤ 1, β ∈ [0; 1]. We conclude by noting that
if β ∈ [0; 1] and γ ∈ [0;∞] is defined by γ = 1
2β
− 1
2
, the quadratic penalty C(x) = γx2
implements X(v) = βv.
A.3 Lemma 8
We first need to introduce some definitions:
Let f be a function defined over [0, 1] and x ∈ [0, 1]. We define:
D
−
f(x) = lim sup
x′↗x
f(x′)− f(x)
x′ − x ,
D−f(x) = lim inf
x′↗x
f(x′)− f(x)
x′ − x ,
One can define similarly D
+
f(x) and D+f(x). Let us recall the first order conditions satisfied
by a function at a local maximum.
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If x∗ is a local maximum of f , then:
D
+
f(x∗) ≤ 0,
D−f(x∗) ≥ 0
We will also use the following real analysis result:
Lemma 10 Any continuous function f on ]0, 1] with a null left derivative is contant.
Let C be a penalty function such that the strategy of the IT satisfies that for any v ∈ [0, 1],
X(v) is either 0 or v. Since the strategy of the IT is non-decreasing, there exists v0 such
that X(v) = 0 for any v ∈ [0, v0[ and X(v) = v for any v ∈]v0, 1].
Besides, the penalty function C must be continuous on ]v0, 1]. Indeed, if v
′ > v ≥ v0,
using the fact that X(v′) = v′,
v
(
v′ − v
2
)
− C(v) ≤ v′
(
v′ − v
′
2
)
− C(v′),
thus, since C is non-decreasing,
0 ≤ C(v′)− C(v) ≤ v′
(
v′ − v
′
2
)
− v
(
v′ − v
2
)
.
Taking the limit as v′ goes to v, we see that C is right continuous at v. Since by hypothesis
it is left continuous on [0, 1], the penalty function C is continuous on ]v0, 1].
Let us show that C has a null left derivative on ]v0, 1]. If v ∈]v0, 1], we know that v is
a profit maximiser at v: v ∈ arg maxx fv(x):. Using the first order condition for the lower
left derivative D− recalled above, at v, D−fv(v) ≥ 0. Since D−fv(v) = −D−C(v), we obtain
D
−
C(v) ≤ 0. Yet, C is increasing, so the lower and upper left derivatives must be positive :
0 ≤ D−C(v) ≤ D−C(v). Thus:
D−C(v) = D
−
C(v) = 0.
This means that the cost function C admits a left derivative at any v ∈]v0, 1], and the
value of this left derivative is zero.
Thus C is continuous and has a null left derivative on ]v0, 1]. Using Lemma 10, we obtain
that C is constant on ]v0, 1]. Let us denote by K the value of C on this interval.
The IT does not trade for v ∈ [0, v0). In that case, since we know that 0 ≤ X(v) ≤ v, we
must have
∀x ∈ [0, v], x
(
v − x
2
)
≤ C(x).
By continuity of the left-hand term and the fact that the right-hand term is non-decreasing,
we obtain
∀x ∈ [0, v0], x
(
v0 − x
2
)
≤ C(x).
There must be equality for x = v0, because otherwise it would not be optimal to select
X(v) = v on the right neighborhood of v0. For the same reason, C can not jump at v0. This
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implies that v0
(
v0 − v02
)
= K, or v0 =
√
2K and therefore C must belong to O.
Assume conversely that C ∈ O. Then for 0 ≤ v < v0, the insider trader will make negative
expected profits if she trades, so that X(v) = 0. For v > v0, there are two cases to consider.
(i) The IT plays x ≥ v0. In that case, the expected penalty K appears as a sunk cost and
the best choice is x = v, leading to a net profit of v
2
2
−K. (ii) The IT plays x ∈ [0, v). The
net profit is then
x
(
v − x
2
)
− C(x) = x
(
v0 − x
2
)
− C(x) + x(v − v0)
≤ x(v − v0)
≤ v0(v − v0)
where the second line uses the fact that C ∈ O. Since
v2
2
−K = v
2
2
− v
2
0
2
=
1
2
(v + v0)(v − v0)
> v0(v − v0),
choice (i) is always preferred. Hence, if C ∈ O, X(v) = 0 for |v|< v0 and X(v) = v for
|v|> v0, which concludes the proof.
A.4 Lemma 9
(i) We first show that the Fmin-efficient frontier is included in the set of points of
piGS (Σ ∩ {F ≥ Fmin})
that are not dominated in piGS (Σ ∩ {F ≥ Fmin}).
Let (G,S) be in the Fmin-efficient frontier. By definition, there is X implemented by C ∈ C
such that G = G(X), S = S(X) and F := E[C(X(v))] ≥ Fmin. Only two cases are possible:
(a) (G,S, F ) ∈ Σ or (b) (G,S, F ) is dominated by a point (G′, S ′, F ′) non-dominated in
the closure (in R3) of all the implementable points, which is exactly Σ. ((G′, S ′, F ′) is
obtained by constructing a sequence (Gn, Sn, Fn) where each point dominates the previous
one and define (G′, S ′, F ′) as its limit, or as (GN , SN , FN) if the procedure stops at N .)
In case (a), we see that (G,S) = piGS(G,S, F ) ∈ piGS(Σ ∩ {F ≥ Fmin}), and since it is in
the Fmin-efficient frontier, it cannot be dominated in that space. In case (b), since (G,S)
is in the Fmin-efficient frontier, we must have G = G
′ and S = S ′ and F ′ ≥ Fmin, so
(G,S) = piGS(G
′, S ′, F ′) ∈ piGS(Σ ∩ {F ≥ Fmin}) and we conclude as in case (a).
(ii) Let us show the other inclusion. It is enough to prove that if a point is dominated in
F(Fmin), it is dominated in piGS (Σ ∩ {F ≥ Fmin}).
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Let (G,S) ∈ piGS(Σ ∩ {F ≥ Fmin}) and F be associated with this point. Assume (G,S)
is dominated in F(Fmin), say by (G′, S ′), associated with F ′ ≥ Fmin. As before, either
(G′, S ′, F ′) ∈ Σ or (G′, S ′, F ′) is dominated by a point in Σ. In both cases, this means that
there exists a point in Σ ∩ {F ≥ Fmin} whose projection dominates (G,S). This concludes
the proof.
B Robustness checks: the case of Gaussian noise
B.1 Shape of X and P under Gaussian noise
Which effects of section 3.4 are peculiar to uniform noises and which effects are robust to
other distributional assumptions?
The qualitative behaviour of the demand function X does not depend on the distribution
of the noise. Consider for instance a cost C(x) = KI|x|>x0 with K, x0 > 0. When the
magnitude of the optimal demand absent penalties is below x0, it remains optimal under the
penalty C. The IT then blocks its demand at x0 in order to avoid the expected penalty K,
as long as trading does not allow to recoup K on average. For v sufficiently large (|v|> v0 for
some v0 > 0), the IT switches back to trading. This creates a jump in the demand function
at ±v0. All these effects are independent of the assumptions on the noise.
The qualitative behaviour of the price function is robust as far as non-linearity is con-
cerned. Flat sections in the demand schedule X induce steep sections in the price function
P . Indeed, when X increases slowly as a function of v, the information that X is likely to
have increased a little (obtained through the observation of d = X(v) + u) implies that v is
likely to have increased a lot. Similarly, steep sections of X induce flat sections of P . Since
the introduction of penalties produces steep and flat sections for X, it produces flat and
steep sections for P .
What does not hold in general is the fact that P has discontinuities. Those are due to the
fact that the uniform distribution has a discontinuous density 1
2
I[−1,1]. In general, one must
have discontinuities in the density of the noise to obtain discontinuities in the price function.
With a continuous noise density, jumps are replaced with sections where P increases fast.
To support these arguments, we report the equilibrium (X,P ) for the model with Gaus-
sian noise (u, v ∼ N(0, 1)) and penalty C.10 We consider the same penalties C as above:
quadratic, linear and constant on large trades.
B.2 Figure 7 under Gaussian noise
We repeat the construction of Figure 7 by assuming Gaussian noise: u, v ∼ N(0; 1). We
obtain Figure 19. The constant costs upon nonzero trades C(x) = KIx 6=0 are doing best
among the penalty functions considered. This is consistent with the results in the uniform
noise case. Other penalties are suboptimal, as before, and the locus of points (S,−G) they
generate is very similar in shape.
10We are not able to prove formally existence (and even less uniqueness) in the case of Gaussian noise.
What we do is run a fixed-point algorithm on equations (5) and (6) and assume that the functions to which
it converges indeed correspond to an exact equilibrium.
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Figure 16: IT demand and pricing under quadratic penalty, Gaussian case
C(x) = αx2, α = 2. Left panel: IT demand X. Right panel: price function P .
Figure 17: IT demand and pricing under linear penalty, Gaussian case
C(x) = α|x|, α = 2. Left panel: IT demand X. Right panel: price function P .
Figure 18: IT demand and pricing under constant penalty, Gaussian case
C(x) = KI|x|>x0 , K = 1, x0 = 0.5.
Left panel: IT demand X. Right panel: price function P .
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Figure 19: Locus of (S,−G) for different penalty functions - Gaussian noise.
C Discussion: Bagnoli, Viswanathan, and Holden (2001)
Consider a static Kyle model where the NT trade with noise u and the fundamental has
distribution v. We provide an informal discussion with two results that complement those of
Bagnoli, Viswanathan, and Holden (2001). Result 1 is new. Result 2 provides an alternative
proof for a particular case of their work. Recall that the model is said to be with individual
orders when the market maker observes the set {x;u} where x is the order of the insider
trader, and to be with aggregate orders when she observes x+ u instead.
Let v0 = E[v], which we do not necessarily assume to be 0. We focus on increasing demand
schedules X. We have the following
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Result 1 (individual orders) A mimicking equilibrium strategy X must be affine in v.
• Since q and u are indistinguishable, the price function is given by
P ({q, u}) = 1
2
(X−1(u) +X−1(q)).
Therefore, the maximisation program of the IT is
max
q
q
(
v − Eu
[
1
2
X−1(u)
]
− 1
2
X−1(q)
)
.
Since X(v) = u in distribution, v = X−1(u) in distribution and the program reduces to
max
q
q
(
v − v0
2
− 1
2
X−1(q)
)
.
Since X is an equilibrium strategy, the derivative of this expression evaluated at q = X(v)
must be zero:
0 = v − v0
2
− X
−1(q)
2
− q
2
1
X ′(X−1(q))
=
v − v0
2
− X(v)
2X ′(v)
.
Therefore, X must satisfy the ODE
X ′(v)(v − v0) = X(v),
i.e. X is affine (in fact linear in v − v0).
We already see that if it is impossible to mimick the noise in an affine manner, we can’t
have a mimicking equilibrium. If, however, this is possible, we automatically have an equi-
librium:
Result 2 (individual orders and aggregate orders) If there exists X increasing and
linear in v − v0 such that X(v) = u in distribution, and P is the corresponding pricing
function, (X,P ) is an equilibrium.
• In the case of individual orders, this result is immediate from the arguments above: indeed
X−1 is affine so the first order condition, which is satisfied for q = X(v) indeed characterizes
a global maximum.
Then, we note that the result extends to the case of aggregate orders. Indeed since X(v)
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and u are indistinguishable, by symmetry
E[X(v)|X(v) + u] = E[u|X(v) + u]
=
1
2
E[X(v) + u|X(v) + u]
=
X(v) + u
2
so, since X is linear, P (x + u) = X
−1(x)+X−1(u)
2
as before, therefore X(v) is still an optimal
demand.
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